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Long Term Evolution (LTE) is a wireless access communications network that consists 
of base stations called eNodeBs (eNBs), which allow connectivity between the mobile 
device or user equipment (UE) and the core network. To save battery power, the UE can 
turn off its radio transceiver circuitry, based on various parameters exchanged during the 
attach procedure with its serving eNB, using a protocol called discontinuous reception 
(DRX). During the DRX period, the UE is still connected to the network and its receiver 
is turned on periodically to determine if the eNB has sent any packets to it. 
This thesis develops the concepts of using simulation to demonstrate if a denial of 
service attack during the long DRX period, as hypothesized by some researchers, can be 
realized. Requirements for experimentation were identified and current simulation tools 
were evaluated as potential candidates. The tools applied were the LTE standards, the 
open source ns-3 network simulator and analysis of actual LTE packet traces. Follow-on 
studies will be required in order to address issues due to the incompleteness of the ns-3 
LTE model and the incompatibility of the file format for LTE traces with that required by 
the Wireshark network protocol analyzer. Essentially, neither tool contains the DRX 
algorithm.  
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. IMPORTANCE OF LONG TERM EVOLUTION SECURITY 
VULNERABILITY INVESTIGATIONS ......................................................1 
B. SCOPE OF THESIS ........................................................................................1 
C. THESIS METHODOLOGY ...........................................................................2 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION ............................................................................3 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................5 
A. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF LONG TERM EVOLUTION 
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE.....................................................................5 
1. Radio Protocol Architecture ...............................................................8 
2. Physical, Logical and Transport Channels ......................................11 
3. Physical Downlink Control Channel ................................................16 
B. LONG TERM EVOLUTION RADIO NETWORK TEMPORARY 
IDENTIFIERS................................................................................................17 
1. Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier ......................................20 
C. CONNECTING TO A LONG TERM EVOLUTION NETWORK ..........22 
1. System Information Acquisition .......................................................22 
2. Bearers ................................................................................................24 
3. Radio Resource Control Protocol .....................................................25 
4. Random Access Channel Procedure ................................................27 
5. Evolved Packet System Connection Management ..........................29 
D. LONG TERM EVOLUTION SECURITY ..................................................31 
1. Security Architecture .........................................................................31 
2. Access Stratum Security ....................................................................33 
E. LONG TERM EVOLUTION DISCONTINUOUS RECEPTION 
PROTOCOL ...................................................................................................35 
1. Short and Long Discontinuous Reception Cycles ...........................36 
2. Connected State ..................................................................................37 
3. Idle State .............................................................................................37 
4. User equipment Feature Group Indicators .....................................38 
5. Medium Access Control Protocol Layer ..........................................39 
F. RELATED WORK IN LONG TERM EVOLUTION SECURITY 
VULNERABILITIES DURING DISCONTINUOUS RECEPTION 
PERIOD ..........................................................................................................42 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................45 
A. DESCRIPTION OF NS-3 OPEN SOURCE NETWORK 
SIMULATOR .................................................................................................45 
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE LENA MODULE IN NS-3 ................................45 
C. USER EQUIPMENT DISCONTINUOUS RECEPTION PERIOD 
ALGORITHM ................................................................................................54 
IV. RESULTS ...................................................................................................................55 
 viii 
A. NS-3 LENA MODEL SIMULATOR LIMITATIONS ...............................55 
B. LIMITATIONS OF LONG TERM EVOLUTION TRACES ...................56 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK ...............................................................59 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................59 
B. FUTURE WORK ...........................................................................................60 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................63 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................67 
  
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Network solutions from GSM to LTE (from [8]) ..............................................5 
Figure 2. Circuit and packet domains (from [9]) ...............................................................6 
Figure 3. Basic EPS architecture (from [9]) ......................................................................7 
Figure 4. 3GPP and non-3GPP access networks (from [9]) ..............................................7 
Figure 5. General protocol model for E-UTRAN interfaces (from [11]) ..........................8 
Figure 6. E-UTRAN Protocol Stack (from [12]) ..............................................................9 
Figure 7. LTE control plane protocol stacks (from [10]) ................................................10 
Figure 8. LTE user plane protocol stacks (from [10]) .....................................................10 
Figure 9. Time domain view of the LTE downlink data flow (from [4]) ........................11 
Figure 10. Downlink channel mapping (from [16]) ..........................................................16 
Figure 11. Uplink channel mapping (from [16]) ...............................................................16 
Figure 12. Uses of LTE Identifiers (from [18]) .................................................................18 
Figure 13. EPS Bearer Service Architecture (from [19]) ..................................................25 
Figure 14. PDN connection and EPS bearer (from [24]) ..................................................25 
Figure 15. Contention-based RACH Procedure (from [25]) .............................................28 
Figure 16. EMM and ECM state transitions (from [26]) ..................................................31 
Figure 17. Overview of the security architecture (from [7]) .............................................32 
Figure 18. Establishment of NAS and AS security contexts during initial attach (from 
[27])..................................................................................................................34 
Figure 19. EPS DRX connection modes and states (from [29]) .......................................35 
Figure 20. DRX Cycles and Timing (from [22])...............................................................36 
Figure 21. Bits 4 and 5 of UE Feature Group Indicators (from [31]) ...............................38 
Figure 22. MAC protocol data unit (from [16]) ................................................................39 
Figure 23. MAC Random access response (from [16]) .....................................................39 
Figure 24. Example of MAC PDU (from [16]) .................................................................41 
Figure 25. Values of LCID for DL-SCH (from [16]) ........................................................41 
Figure 26. Values of LCID for UL-SCH (from [16]) ........................................................41 
Figure 27. Denial of service attack using C-RNTI (from [5]) ...........................................43 
Figure 28. Successful Packet Injection Attack (from [5]) .................................................44 
Figure 29. Overview of the LTE-EPC simulation model (from [34]) ...............................46 
Figure 30. LTE radio protocol stack model for UE on the data plane (from [34]) ...........47 
Figure 31. LTE radio protocol stack model for UE on the control plane (from [34]) ......48 
Figure 32. LTE PHY and channel model architecture for UE (from [34]) .......................48 
Figure 33. LTE radio protocol stack architecture for eNB on the data plane (from 
[34])..................................................................................................................49 
Figure 34. LTE radio protocol stack architecture for eNB on the control plane (from 
[34])..................................................................................................................50 
Figure 35. LTE PHY and channel model architecture for eNB (from [34]) .....................50 
Figure 36. LTE-EPC data plane protocol stack in LENA model (from [34]) ...................51 
Figure 37. EPC control plane model (from [34]) ..............................................................52 
Figure 38. LTE sub-frame in LENA (from [34]) ..............................................................53 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Logical control and traffic channels provided by the MAC (after [16]) ..........12 
Table 2. Physical transport channels used by the MAC (after [16]) ..............................13 
Table 3. Physical control and data channels (after [16]) ................................................14 
Table 4. Transport processor physical channel control information and channels 
(after [16]) ........................................................................................................15 
Table 5. Supported PDCCH formats (from [14]) ..........................................................17 
Table 6. Description of LTE identifiers (from [18]) ......................................................20 
Table 7. RNTI values (from [16]) ..................................................................................21 
Table 8. RNTI usage (from [16]) ...................................................................................21 
Table 9. Some of the contents of SIB1 (after [23]) ........................................................23 
Table 10. Some of the contents of SIB2 (after [23]) ........................................................24 
Table 11. Characteristics of RRC protocol states (after [19]) ..........................................27 
Table 12. Security Termination Points (from [19]) .........................................................32 
Table 13. DRX parameters (after [16]) ............................................................................40 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
2G second generation 
3G third generation 
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project 
4G fourth generation 
AAA authentication, authorization and accounting 
AKA authentication and key agreement  
APN access point name 
AS access stratum or access layer 
BCH broadcast channel 
BCCH broadcast control channel 
BS base station 
CCCH common control channel  
CCE  control channel elements 
CDMA code division multiple access 
CDMA2000 family of 3G mobile technology standards that use CDMA 
C-PDU control protocol data unit  
CFI control format indicator 
CP cyclic prefix 
C-RNTI cell radio network temporary identifier 
CS circuit switching 
DCCH dedicated control channel  
DCI downlink control information 
DL downlink or transmission path from eNB to the UE 
DL-SCH downlink shared channel 
DoS denial of service 
D-PDU data protocol data unit  
DRB data radio bearer 
DRX discontinuous reception 
DTCH dedicated traffic channel  
DTX discontinuous transmission 
 xiv 
DSCP DiffServ code point  
ECM EPS connection management  
EDGE enhanced data rates for global evolution 
EMM EPS mobility management  
eNB base station called evolved NodeB or eNodeB in LTE 
EPC evolved packet core 
ePDG evolved packet data gateway 
EPS evolved packet system 
E-RAB  E-UTRAN radio access bearer 
E-UTRA evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access 
E-UTRAN evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access network 
FAPI  femto application platform interface 
FDD frequency division duplexing 
FFT fast Fourier transform 
FGI feature group indicators 
GBR guaranteed bit rate  
GERAN GSM EDGE radio access network 
GPRS general packet radio service 
GPS global positioning system 
GSM Global System of Mobile Communications 
GTP GPRS tunneling protocol 
HARQ hybrid automatic repeat-request  
HI hybrid ARQ indicator  
HSPA high speed packet access 
HSS home subscriber server 
Hz Hertz, a unit of frequency defined as one cycle per second 
IMS IP multimedia subsystem 
IMT-Advanced International Mobile Telecommunications Advanced 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPsec  Internet Protocol security 
ISI inter symbol interference 
ITU International Telecommunications Union 
 xv 
LCID logical channel ID  
LTE Long Term Evolution 
LTE-A LTE advanced 
MAC medium access control protocol 
MCH  multicast channel  
MCCH multicast control channel 
MIB master information block 
MBMS multimedia broadcast/multicast service 
MME mobility management entity 
MPLS multiprotocol label switching 
MS mobile station  
MTCH multicast traffic channel 
Node B equivalent to the BTS (base transceiver station) in UMTS 
NAS non-access stratum or layer 
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 
OFDM  orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing 
OFDMA orthogonal frequency division multiple access 
PAPR peak-to-average power ratio 
PBCH physical broadcast channel  
PCH paging channel  
PCCH paging control channel  
PCFICH physical control format indicator channel  
PCI physical cell identification 
PDCCH physical downlink control channel  
PDSCH physical downlink shared channel  
P-GW packet data network gateway or PDN-GW or PGW 
PHICH physical HARQ indicator channel 
PDCP packet data convergence protocol 
PDN packet data network  
PDU protocol data unit 
PHY physical layer 
PLMN public land mobile network 
 xvi 
PMCH physical multicast channel  
PRACH physical random access channel  
PS packet switching  
PSS primary synchronization signal 
PUCCH physical uplink control channel  
PUSCH physical uplink shared channel  
QAM quadrature amplitude modulation 
QoS quality of service  
QCI QoS class identifier 
QPSK quadrature phase shift keying 
RAB radio access bearer 
RACH random access channel  
RAN radio access network 
RA-RNTI radio network temporary identity  
RAT radio access technology 
RB resource block composed of several resource elements 
RE  resource element of 15 kHz subcarrier by one symbol in LTE 
REG  resource element group composed of four physical RE 
RF radio frequency 
RLC radio link control protocol 
RNTI radio network temporary identifier  
RRC radio resource control protocol 
RSSI received signal strength indication 
SAE system architecture evolution 
SC-FDMA single carrier frequency division multiple access 
SDU service data unit 
SFN system frame number  
S-GW serving gateway or SGW 
SI system information 
SIB system information block  
SIB# system information block type # 
SRB signaling radio bearer 
 xvii 
SI-RNTI system information RNTI  
SS subscriber station 
SSS secondary synchronization signal 
TCP transmission control protocol 
TDD time division duplexing 
TDMA time division multiple access 
TFT traffic flow templates  
TMSI temporary mobile subscriber identity 
UCI uplink control information  
UDP user datagram protocol 
UE user equipment, sometimes called mobile equipment 
UL uplink transmission path from the UE to the eNB 
UL-SCH uplink shared channel 
UMTS Universal Telecommunications System 
UTRA Universal Terrestrial Radio Access 
UTRAN universal terrestrial radio access network 
VoIP voice over Internet Protocol 
WCDMA wideband code division multiple access 
WiMAX worldwide interoperability for microwave access 








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xix 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The United States government’s goal of delivering information and services to the 
American people, as well as ensuring their defense and safety, depends heavily on mobile 
technology. The government is planning on using the high bandwidth and efficiency of 
the wireless communications technology called Long Term Evolution (LTE) to achieve 
that goal. 
Most researchers have focused on improving LTE’s performance and efficiency 
for the past ten years and have only recently started investigating the security 
vulnerabilities of LTE. The development of the LTE standards have taken into account 
the security deficiencies of prior generations of wireless communications technologies, 
but some researchers have theorized cyber attacks could still occur in LTE during times 
when those security protocols are inactive or weak. The specific vulnerabilities in LTE 
often mentioned include illegal use of user and mobile equipment, location tracking, 
denial of service attacks, and data integrity attacks. However, none of the researchers has 
provided any experimental data to support the claims of such vulnerabilities.  
It is hypothesized that if one obtains the user identity information sent in the clear 
during network attach, it could then be used to conduct a denial of service or data 
integrity attack during the long-term power saving mode. Analysis of LTE standards has 
revealed that the user’s equipment can be vulnerable to a cyber attack during the network 
attach mode, or during the long term power saving mode, because security protocols are 
either inactive or weak.  
The open source ns-3 network simulator was investigated as a tool, but it was 
found that the LTE model was incomplete and did not include the complete medium 
access control protocol header or the data unit and the power saving algorithm. Next, 
analysis of captured LTE packet traces available at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
was considered. The Wireshark network protocol analyzer tool indicates a capability to 
decode the LTE medium access control, radio link control and packet data convergence 
protocol headers, if LTE packet traces are captured using the dissectors for those headers. 
 xx 
However, the NPS LTE packet traces available were not in the libpcap file format 
required by Wireshark and the power saving algorithm was not in effect when the traces 
were recorded by a different commercial software package. As a result, it was not 
possible to analyze if the security protocols were weak during the attach procedure or 
during the power saving mode.  
The LTE standards have parameters defined for a power saving algorithm but do 
not specify how to implement the algorithm. In fact, very few device vendors have 
implemented a power saving algorithm, though many currently have plans to do so in the 
future. Appropriate laboratory testing equipment and software for analyzing LTE signals 
are required to demonstrate a cyber attack in LTE, both of which were not available at the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. IMPORTANCE OF LONG TERM EVOLUTION SECURITY 
VULNERABILITY INVESTIGATIONS 
The Digital Government Strategy was released on May 23, 2012 [1] with the goal 
of delivering “digital government information and services anywhere, anytime, on any 
device.” Mobile technology is a big part of that strategy. The “Department of Defense 
Mobile Device Strategy,” released in June 2012, focuses on wireless infrastructure, 
mobile devices and mobile applications to advance operational effectiveness [2]. The 700 
megahertz (MHz) public safety band comprises 24 MHz of spectrum designated for 
public safety use. In its Third Report and Order, the Federal Communications 
Commission “codified the requirement that 700 MHz public safety broadband network 
operators adopt the” Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 8 Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) “or higher as a common technology platform” [3]. Most cellular service 
providers have plans to migrate their current cellular technology to LTE. However, little 
research has been done to date into the security vulnerabilities of LTE because most 
researchers have been focused on improving its performance and efficiency.  
B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
LTE is an access communications network of base stations called eNodeBs 
(eNBs) that allow connectivity between the mobile devices or user equipment (UE) and 
the core network. To save battery power, the UE can turn off its radio transceiver 
circuitry, based on various parameters exchanged during the attach procedure with its 
serving eNB, using a protocol called Discontinuous Reception (DRX). The radio is 
optimized for performance on the downlink from the network to the UE because the 
transmitter at the base station is assumed to have plenty of power [4]. Although 
processing power has increased, mobile device battery power has stayed essentially 
constant, resulting in the optimization of the UE radio for power consumption instead of 
efficiency on the uplink to the eNB. During the DRX period, the UE is still connected to 
the network and its receiver is turned on periodically to determine if the eNB has sent any 
packets to it using paging and if it should become active.  
 2 
The development of the 3GPP LTE standards has taken into account the security 
deficiencies of prior generations of wireless communications technologies. It has been 
suggested in some LTE security research papers that the long DRX period is one of 
several potential security vulnerabilities in LTE [5], [6]. It is hypothesized that if one 
obtains the user identity information sent in the clear during network attach, it could then 
be used to conduct a denial of service or data integrity attack during the long DRX 
period. However, no research has been conducted to confirm such an exploit and to 
determine network properties that make the DRX protocol vulnerable to cyber attacks 
given LTE’s enhanced security protocols.  
This thesis investigates if it is possible to demonstrate a denial of service (DoS) 
attack during the LTE power-saving long DRX period using analysis and simulation. 
Specifically, it will investigate if an attacker could obtain the Cell Radio Network 
Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI) of a UE and use it during the long DRX period to prevent 
the UE from communicating with the network. The C-RNTI is a unique and temporary 
UE identifier given by the serving eNB to identify one specific radio channel from 
another radio channel and one user from another user within the cell. A primary benefit 
of the study would be to identify the conditions under which such an attack is possible 
and to determine potential mitigation solutions. 
C. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
In order to determine the specific properties of the long DRX period that makes 
LTE vulnerable, it is necessary to examine the radio resource control (RRC) protocols 
and algorithms used during establishment and periodic maintenance of the connection 
between the UE and the network. It is also important to examine the state of the mutual 
authentication between the UE and eNB during the long DRX period.  
This study will identify the requirements for investigating DRX vulnerabilities in 
LTE and evaluate the use of the open source ns-3 network simulator. The study will not 
investigate how to circumvent the five security levels in LTE developed by 3GPP [7]. 
 3 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Investigation of the 3GPP LTE standards relevant for attaching to a network, 
security establishment and maintenance of the connection are in Section II. Detailed 
information on the RRC and DRX protocols is analyzed. The state of the connection and 
what triggers the DRX period are examined. The types of LTE radio network temporary 
identifiers used during a connection are explored. In addition, prior work in LTE security 
vulnerabilities during the DRX period is summarized. 
Section III describes the thesis methodology, including the open source ns-3 
network simulator and the LTE module within it. Section IV discusses the results of the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF LONG TERM EVOLUTION NETWORK 
ARCHITECTURE 
LTE is a fourth generation (4G) wireless communications network whose 
standards were first developed by the 3GPP in 2004. LTE is designed to improve upon 
the reliability, bandwidth limitations and security vulnerabilities of older cellular 
technologies such as Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), general packet 
radio service (GPRS), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), code 
division multiple access (CDMA) and high speed packet access (HSPA) [8]. Most 
cellular wireless systems consist of a radio access network (RAN) and a core network as 
shown in Figure 1. The LTE core network is called the evolved packet core (EPC). The 
LTE access stratum (AS) network consists of coordinating base stations, known as eNBs, 
which allow connectivity between the mobile devices or UE and the EPC. The access 
network of eNBs is also known as the evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access (E-UTRA) 
or evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN). The evolved packet 
system (EPS) is composed of the E-UTRAN and the EPC.  
Figure 1.  Network solutions from GSM to LTE (from [8]) 
 6 
The 3GPP community made many decisions that have affected the architecture of 
the LTE network [9]. Internet Protocol (IP) is used to transport all services in LTE for 
routing efficiency, which means each network functional element or network node 
requires an IP address. The use of a “flat architecture” means that few network nodes are 
involved in the handling of the traffic and protocol conversion is avoided. The user data 
(user plane) is separated from the signaling (control plane) to make the scaling of one 
independent from the other. The EPC is an evolution of the packet-switched architecture 
used in third generation (3G) cellular technologies instead of the circuit-switched 
architecture used in second generation (2G) cellular technologies, as shown in Figure 2. 
In circuit-switching (CS), dedicated circuits are established between the calling and 
called parties from source to destination in the telecommunication network. With packet-
switching (PS), data is transported in packets without the establishment of dedicated 
circuits and bandwidth is shared. 
Figure 2.  Circuit and packet domains (from [9])  
The EPC is made up of subcomponents such as the mobility management entity 
(MME) for the control plane, the serving gateway (S-GW) and packet data network 
gateway (P-GW) for the user plane, and the home subscriber server (HSS) as shown in 
Figure 3. The EPC is linked to the external internet, private corporate or the IP 
multimedia subsystem (IMS) networks. The MME handles the control plane signaling 
related to UE mobility, security for E-UTRAN access, and the tracking and paging of the 
UE in idle mode. The MME also maintains context information for UEs in various states 
[10]. The HSS is a database that contains user-related and subscriber-related information. 
It also provides support functions in mobility management, call and session setup, as well 
 7 
as user authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) functions. The S-GW and P-
GW transport the user plane IP data traffic between the UE and the external networks. 
The S-GW serves the UE by routing the incoming and outgoing IP packets. The P-GW is 
selected from access point name (APN) parameters provided by the UE or service 
operator. The P-GW routes packets from the EPC to the external IP and IMS networks 
using the IP address allocated to the UE during the attach procedure. Transport is through 
IP and multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) backbone networks.  
 
Figure 3.  Basic EPS architecture (from [9]) 
3GPP specifications define how 3GPP and non-3GPP radio access networks can 
connect with each other as shown in Figure 4 [9]. The network service operator can split 
non-3GPP accesses into two categories. Trusted non-3GPP accesses can interact directly 
with the EPC. Untrusted non-3GPP accesses use an evolved packet data gateway (ePDG) 
to interact with the EPC.  
 
Figure 4.  3GPP and non-3GPP access networks (from [9])  
 8 
1. Radio Protocol Architecture 
The LTE radio protocol architecture consists of the logically independent control 
and user planes, both of which are separated into a logically independent radio network 
layer and a transport network layer [11] as shown in Figure 5. The user plane contains 
application data packets processed by protocols such as transmission control protocol 
(TCP), user datagram protocol (UDP) and IP [12]. The control plane sends signaling 
messages to control network access connections between the UE and the core network, or 
the UE and the access network, and user resources. The control plane establishes the user 
plane with the desired quality of service (QoS).  
 
Figure 5.  General protocol model for E-UTRAN interfaces (from [11])  
The layers of the E-UTRAN protocol stack can be seen in Figure 6. A packet 
received by a layer is called a service data unit (SDU) and a packet output from a layer is 
called a protocol data unit (PDU). In both the user and control planes, the information is 
processed by the packet data convergence protocol (PDCP), the radio link control (RLC) 
protocol, the medium access control (MAC) protocol and the physical layer (PHY). The 
LTE PHY is usually full duplex. The MAC layer determines how to use the transport 
channels, how to pack the information in it, and what modulation and coding to configure 
the PHY layer with for the correct transmit data rate [4]. When a UE is powered on, it 
initiates an attach procedure to register with an eNB in the access network using the RRC 
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protocols, and to register with the MME in the core network using the non-access stratum 
(NAS) protocols. The downlink flow progresses upward and uplink flow progresses 
downward through the layers shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  E-UTRAN protocol stack (from [12])  
The control plane protocol stack functions are shown in Figure 7. The NAS 
protocol is used for non-radio communication between the UE and the core network 
MME after attachment. The NAS protocol performs authentication, registration, bearer 
context activation and deactivation, as well as location registration management [13]. The 
RRC protocol is used to exchange the control plane signaling messages in the AS 
between the eNB and the UE [12]. In the uplink, the UE MAC coordinates measurements 
from the PHY to the RRC about UE status and local conditions, and the RRC 
communicates with the eNB using control messages. In the downlink from the eNB to the 
UE, the RRC controls the PHY modulation and configuration settings. The MME can 
communicate with the eNB through the S1-AP signaling interface protocol. 
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Figure 7.  LTE control plane protocol stacks (from [10]) 
The user plane protocol stack functions between the eNB and UE are shown in 
Figure 8.  In the user plane, packets are encapsulated and tunneled between the P-GW 
and the eNB using different tunneling protocols depending on the logical interface [12]. 
The GPRS tunneling protocol (GTP) is used for the S1 interface between the eNB and S-
GW, and the S5/S8 interface between the S-GW and P-GW. S5 is used if the two devices 
are in the same network, and S8 is used if they are in different networks. GTP is used to 
encapsulate user data transported through the core network and also carries UE specific 
signaling traffic between various core networks. 
 
Figure 8.  LTE user plane protocol stacks (from [10]) 
A logical diagram of E-UTRAN protocol layers with data flow in the downlink 
from network to UE is shown in Figure 9. The duration of each time slot is 0.5 
milliseconds (ms), each sub-frame is two slots, and each radio frame contains 10 sub-
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frames. Each sub-frame is also known as the transmission time interval. An uplink or 
downlink physical channel corresponds to a set of resource elements (RE) carrying 
information originating from the higher layers [14]. Each RE is uniquely defined by an 
index pair in a time slot of a sub-frame. 
 
Figure 9.  Time domain view of the LTE downlink data flow (from [4])  
2. Physical, Logical and Transport Channels 
UE and functional entities must be explicitly allocated uplink and downlink non-
overlapping resources to send and receive LTE duplex traffic. Data and signaling 
messages are carried on different types of logical or transport or physical channels 
depending on the kind of information they carry between the layers and by the way in 
which the information is processed. A common shared channel is used for all users in a 
cell (point to multipoint), whereas dedicated channels are used to communicate with only 
one user (point to point). The RLC layer passes data to the MAC layer as logical channels 
defined in Table 1 [15]. The MAC layer formats and sends the logical channel data to the 
physical layer as transport channels defined in Table 2. The physical layer encodes the 
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transport channel data to the physical channels defined in Table 3. Table 4 shows the 
control information created by the transport channel processor to support the low-level 
























 For paging when the 
network does not know the 
location cell of the UE or to 








For transmitting control 
information between a 








For transmitting dedicated 
control information bi-
directionally between a 
network and a UE having 






X X X 
For the transfer of user 








 For transmitting point-to-
multipoint control 
information from the 
network to the UEs that 
receive multimedia 








 For transmitting point-to-
multipoint traffic data from 
the network to the UEs that 
receive MBMS 









Broadcasts in the entire coverage 







Supports DRX to enable UE power 
saving. Supports hybrid automatic 
repeat-request (HARQ). Supports 
dynamic link adaptation by varying 
the modulation, coding and transmit 
power. Supports MBMS 
transmission. Optionally supports 
broadcast in the entire cell. 
Optionally supports beam forming. 
Supports both dynamic and semi-





Supports DRX to enable UE power 
saving. Broadcasts in the entire 
coverage area of the cell. Mapped 
to physical resources which can be 
used dynamically also for 





Broadcasts in the entire coverage 
area of the cell. Supports multicast-
broadcast single-frequency network 
(MBSFN) combining of MBMS 
transmission on multiple cells, 






Supports dynamic link adaptation 
by varying the transmit power and 
potentially modulation and coding. 
Supports HARQ. Supports dynamic 
and semi-static resource allocation. 







Carries minimal information from 
UE and transmissions may be lost 
due to collisions 











Within a 40 ms interval, broadcasts a limited 
number of parameters essential for initial 
access of the cell (downlink system 
bandwidth, the physical HARQ indicator 
channel structure, and the most significant 
eight-bits of the system frame number) in a 








Carries the DL-SCH and PCH.  
Quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK), 16-
QAM (quadrature amplitude modulation), 







Informs the UE about the resource allocation 
of PCH and DL-SCH, and HARQ 
information related to DL-SCH. Carries the 






Carries the MCH 








Carries the UL-SCH 








Carries HARQ, positive acknowledgments 
(ACKs) or negative acknowledgments 
(NACKs) in response to downlink 
transmission, scheduling request (SR), 
channel quality indicators (CQI) reports. 









Carries the random access preamble a UE 
uses to access the network in non-
synchronized mode and allow the UE to 
synchronize timing with the eNB 
Table 3.   Physical control and data channels (after [16]) 
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Carries the CFI used to dynamically 
indicate the number of symbols to be 
used for PDCCH 
physical HARQ 
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PHICH X  
Carries HARQ ACK/NAKs in 
response to uplink transmissions 
which indicates to the UE whether 
the eNB correctly received uplink 
user data carried on the PUSCH. 
QPSK modulation. 
Table 4.   Transport processor physical channel control information and channels 
(after [16]) 
The mapping between the logical, physical and transport channels for the 
downlink can be seen in Figure 10. In the uplink, the common control channel (CCCH), 
dedicated control channel (DCCH) and dedicated traffic channel (DTCH) are all mapped 
to the uplink shared channel (UL-SCH) as shown in Figure 11 [4].  
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Figure 10.  Downlink channel mapping (from [16]) 
 
 
Figure 11.  Uplink channel mapping (from [16]) 
3. Physical Downlink Control Channel 
All MAC transmissions on the UL-SCH must be scheduled by the random access 
channel (RACH) procedure. The physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) carries all 
user data and all multi-cast signaling messages. The physical downlink control channel 
(PDCCH) carries the layer one downlink control information (DCI) message that 
indicates who the data is for, as well as the type and format of data transmitted [17]. 
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There can be four PDCCH formats each of which has a set number of control channel 
elements (CCE) as shown in Table 5 [14]. Each CCE is composed of nine resource 
element groups (REG), and each REG is composed of four physical resource elements 
(RE). Multiple PDCCHs can be transmitted in a sub-frame by the eNB. The physical 
control format indicator channel (PCFICH) carries information about the number of 
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) symbols used for transmission of 







Number of PDCCH 
bits 
0 1 9 72 
1 2 18 144 
2 4 36 288 
3 8 72 576 
Table 5.   Supported PDCCH formats (from [14]) 
The eNB can use one of many defined DCI formats based on the transmission 
mode and the type of radio network temporary identifiers (RNTI) for the associated 
PDCCH. Since the location of a specific PDCCH and type of DCI can vary based on 
whether it is for a specific UE or a shared broadcast, the UE needs to search all the 
possible locations in the frame for it and conduct a blind decoding of the PDCCH. 
B. LONG TERM EVOLUTION RADIO NETWORK TEMPORARY 
IDENTIFIERS  
There are many types of radio network temporary identifiers (RNTI) used in the 
LTE network as shown in Figure 12 and details of each one are given in Table 6.   
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Table 6.   Description of LTE identifiers (from [18]) 
1. Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier  
The cell radio network temporary identifier (C-RNTI) is assigned by the serving 
eNB to a UE during the RRC attach procedure. The C-RNTI is an E-UTRAN specific 
identifier and the EPC network has no context information about it. The C-RNTI is 
transmitted in clear text [6] since there are no security protocols during the initial attach 
procedure. 
There are various versions of the C-RNTI [19] used by the E-UTRAN in a cell: 
 C-RNTI: unique identification used for identifying RRC Connection and 
scheduling 
 Semi-persistent scheduling C-RNTI: unique identification used for semi-
persistent scheduling; 
 Temporary C-RNTI: identification used for the random access procedure 
 TPC-PUSCH-RNTI: identification used for the power control of PUSCH 
 TPC-PUCCH-RNTI: identification used for the power control of PUCCH 
The UE may be configured by RRC with a DRX functionality that controls the 
UE’s PDCCH monitoring activity for the UE’s C-RNTI or TPC-PUCCH-RNTI or TPC-
PUSCH-RNTI or semi-persistent scheduling C-RNTI [16]. 
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A UE uses the same C-RNTI on all serving cells [16] in the E-UTRAN. RNTI 
values used in the MAC layer are shown in Table 7.  
Table 7.   RNTI values (from [16]) 
The usage of the RNTI values by the MAC layer in the associated transport and 
logical channels are shown in Table 8.  
Table 8.   RNTI usage (from [16]) 
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C. CONNECTING TO A LONG TERM EVOLUTION NETWORK 
When a UE initially powers on, it uses an initial synchronization process to search 
for the correct frequency from the many different ones available on the air. Timing is 
critical because a UE can be moving from the base station, and LTE requires 
microsecond level precision. The speed-of-light propagation delay can cause a collision 
or a timing problem [4]. Once synchronized to the correct frequency, the UE reads the 
system information to find the allowable public land mobile network (PLMN) to connect 
to [20]. If the PLMN value is correct, it reads more system information on network 
resources. When a subscribed user is in her operator’s PLMN, it is called a home-PLMN. 
Roaming allows users to move outside their home network and use the resources from 
another operator’s network, called a visited-PLMN. 
In order to gain access to the network’s resources or channels, the UE initiates a 
random access procedure over a shared channel with the eNB using the RRC protocol. If 
there are many UEs in the cell, a contention based random access procedure is used to 
prevent collisions between the many requests. Alternatively, a contention free or non-
contention based random access procedure can be used whereby an eNB assigns a 6 bit 
preamble code to the UE to prevent its request from colliding with other UE requests. 
1. System Information Acquisition 
When a UE first powers on, it attempts to acquire physical cell identification 
(PCI), time slot and frame synchronization so it can read system information (SI) from a 
particular network using a system information acquisition procedure. The UE detects the 
PCI from the primary synchronization signal (PSS) and secondary synchronization signal 
(SSS) regularly broadcast by the eNB. System information is divided into a master 
information block (MIB) and a number of system information blocks (SIBs). The 
contents of the MIB and SIBs are specified in [21]. 
The MIB defines the most essential physical layer information of the cell required 
to receive further system information [19]. SystemInformationBlockType1 (SIB1) 
contains information relevant when evaluating if a UE is allowed to access a cell and 
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defines the scheduling of other system information blocks. 
SystemInformationBlockType2 (SIB2) contains radio resource configuration, common 
and shared channel information which is common for all UEs. A 28-bit E-UTRAN cell 
identifier which identifies a radio cell within a PLMN is broadcast with SIB1 [22]. The 
MIB is mapped on the logical BCCH and carried on transport and physical BCH while all 
other SI messages are mapped on the BCCH and dynamically carried on DL-SCH where 
they can be identified through the System Information RNTI (SI-RNTI). Both the MIB 
and SIB1 use a fixed schedule with a periodicity of 40 and 80 milliseconds, respectively, 
while the scheduling of other SI messages is flexible and indicated by SIB1. The content 
of the MIB includes the downlink channel bandwidth in terms of resource blocks (RB), 
the PHICH configuration (duration and resource) and the system frame number (SFN) 
[19]. Some of the cell access parameters contained in SIB1 and SIB2 are shown in Table 
9 and Table 10.   
 
PLMN identity: Up to 6 PLMN identities can be specified 
Tracking area code: Range from 0 to 65546 
Cell Id: 28 bits eNB identity 
Cell barred: whether cell is barred or not 
Intra Frequency cell reselection info: To select other cells when the target cell is 
barred 
CSG indication: To indicate whether this cell is a Closed Subscriber Group (CSG) 
cell or not. If it is CSG cell, then CSG identity stored in the UE should match with 
CSG id of the cell 
q-RxLevMin: Minimum required level in the cell  
Band indicator: Cell frequency band indicator 
Scheduling information of other SIBs 
Table 9.   Some of the contents of SIB1 (after [23]) 
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Access Class Barring Parameters 
Random access channel (RACH) related parameters 
Idle mode paging configurations which includes the defaultPagingCycle parameter 
for the default DRX cycle in idle mode in terms of radio frames 
Uplink physical control channel (PUCCH) and shared channel (PUSCH) 
configurations 
Uplink power control and sounding reference signal configurations 
Uplink carrier frequency / bandwidth 
Cell barring information 
Table 10.   Some of the contents of SIB2 (after [23]) 
If the network changes the system information, it first notifies the UEs about the 
change using a modification period, after which it transmits the updated system 
information. A paging message, with the systemInfoModification parameter, informs the 
UE that the system information will change at the next modification period boundary 
[21]. 
2. Bearers 
The initial attach procedure is used to authenticate and authorize the UE to send 
and receive data, as well as obtain an IP address. A data path from the UE through the 
eNB to the MME, S-GW and P-GW is established at the end of the attach procedure. 
There are several kinds of data paths or bearers as shown in Figure 13. A packet data 
network (PDN) connection is composed of at least one default bearer, created during the 
attach procedure, and possibly additional dedicated bearers as shown in Figure 14. A 
default bearer is always a non-guaranteed bit rate type offering best effort service, such as 
bursty internet traffic. Services requiring specific QoS performance (i.e., voice, video 
streaming) use guaranteed bit rate bearers (GBRs) with resources permanently allocated 
by admission control or dedicated bearers with traffic flow templates (TFT). Each default 




identifier. A data radio bearer (DRB) transports the packets between a UE and an eNB. 
An E-UTRAN radio access bearer (E-RAB) transports the packets between the UE and 















Figure 13.  EPS bearer service architecture (from [19]) 
 
 
Figure 14.  PDN connection and EPS bearer (from [24])  
3. Radio Resource Control Protocol 
The radio resource control (RRC) protocol, which exists in the UE and the eNB, 
is used to perform connection control and management, including establishment of the 
radio bearer. RRC provides broadcast of common control information from the upper 
layers and transfer of dedicated control information for a specific UE. The main services 
and functions of the RRC layer [19] include: 
 26 
 Broadcast of system information related to the non-access stratum (NAS) 
 Broadcast of system information related to the access stratum (AS) 
 Paging 
 Establishment, maintenance and release of an RRC connection between 
the UE and E-UTRAN including: 
 Allocation of temporary identifiers between UE and E-UTRAN 
 Configuration of low priority signaling radio bearers (SRB) and 
high priority SRB 
 Configuration of the security parameters and security functions including 
key management 
 Establishment, configuration, maintenance and release of point to point 
radio bearers 
 Mobility functions including: 
 UE measurement reporting and control of the reporting for inter-
cell and inter-RAT (radio access technologies) mobility 
 Handover 
 UE cell selection and reselection and control of cell selection and 
reselection 
 Context transfer at handover 
 Notification and counting for MBMS services 
 Establishment, configuration, maintenance and release of radio bearers for 
MBMS services 
 QoS management functions 
 UE measurement reporting and control of the reporting 
 NAS direct message transfer to/from NAS from/to UE 
The RRC functions depend upon whether the UE is in the idle or connected mode. 
A UE is in the RRC_CONNECTED state when an RRC connection has been established; 
otherwise it is in the RRC_IDLE state [21]. In RRC_IDLE, the UE camps on a cell after 
a cell selection or reselection process monitoring information on radio link quality and 
cell status [12]. In RRC_CONNECTED, the UE monitors control channels associated 
with the shared data channel. The characteristics of RRC states are shown in Table 11.  
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Mode States And Transitions 
RRC_IDLE 
 Operator’s PLMN selection 
 A UE specific DRX may be configured by NAS upper layer 
 UE monitors a paging channel to detect incoming calls, 
system information 
 Cell selection or re-selection mobility 
 The UE shall have been allocated an ID which uniquely 
identifies the UE in a tracking area 
 No RRC context stored in the eNB 
RRC_CONNECTED 
 UE has an E-UTRAN-RRC connection and context in E-
UTRAN  
 E-UTRAN knows the cell which the UE belongs to 
 Network controlled mobility (handover and inter-RAT cell 
change) 
 UE performs neighbor cell measurements and reports it 
 At PDCP/RLC/MAC level: 
o UE can transmit and/or receive data to/from network 
o UE monitors control signaling channel for shared 
data channel to determine if data is for it 
o UE reports channel quality information and feedback 
information 
o DRX period can be configured by the eNB according 
to UE activity level for UE power saving and 
efficient resource utilization 
Table 11.   Characteristics of RRC protocol states (after [19]) 
4. Random Access Channel Procedure 
When the UE wants to initially attach to a LTE network, it must request a RRC 
connection from the eNB using a random access channel (RACH) procedure in order to 
obtain dedicated resources for a radio bearer. All MAC transmissions on the uplink 
shared channel (UL-SCH) must be scheduled RACH procedures. The RACH is triggered 
by five events [19]: 
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1. Initial access from disconnected state (RRC_IDLE)  
2. RRC connection re-establishment or radio failure 
3. Handover requiring random access procedure 
4. Downlink or uplink data arrival during RRC_CONNECTED after uplink 
PHY has lost synchronization (possibly due to power save operation) or 
for UE positioning 
5. Uplink data arrival when no dedicated scheduling request (PUCCH) 
channels available 
Contention-based RACH, when multiple UEs attempt simultaneous access, can be 
used in all five events. Non-contention-based RACH applies to handover and downlink 
data arrival only. Figure 15 shows the steps in a contention-based RACH procedure. 
 
Figure 15.  Contention-based RACH procedure (from [25]) 
In Figure 15 the UE sends msg1, which contains one randomly selected specific 
pattern or signature called a RACH preamble and a 6-bit random access radio network 
temporary identity (RA-RNTI), on the RACH in the uplink. The RA-RNTI is determined 
from the time slot number in which the preamble is sent [20] and the preamble is one out 
of a special set of 64 physical layer subcarriers using a Zadoff-Chu sequence. If another 
UE uses the same preamble at the same time, there will be contention for resources. If no 
response is received from the eNB, the UE will increase its power and send the RACH 
preamble again. 
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The eNB’s random access response in msg2 is addressed to the RA-RNTI and 
sent by the MAC layer on the physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) using the 
downlink shared channel (DL-SCH). It indicates that resources have been reserved for 
the UE. For initial access, the response includes a RA-preamble identifier, timing 
alignment information, initial uplink grant, and assignment of a 16-bit temporary cell 
radio network temporary identifier (C-RNTI) to the UE.  
The UE sends a scheduled transmission response in msg3 with the temporary C-
RNTI requesting RRC connection, using hybrid automatic repeat-request (HARQ) and 
radio link control (RLC) transparent mode on the UL-SCH. In case the assigned 
temporary C-RNTI is in use by another UE, the message also contains either the 
temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI), if the UE has previously connected to the 
same network, or a random value, if the UE is connecting for the very first time. The 
TMSI is randomly assigned by the network to every registered UE. 
The eNB sends msg4 with a new C-RNTI which will be used for further 
communication so that only the UE with it continues with the transmission while others 
back-off and try again after expiration of RACH specific timers. The C-RNTI is used in 
calculating the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of PDCCH transmissions in the DL-SCH 
and for scrambling in the UL-SCH [14]. If no CRC error is detected, the PDDCH is for 
the UE. At the end of a successful RACH procedure, the UE is in RRC_CONNECTED 
state enabling it to exchange data with the eNB using dedicated signaling radio bearer 1 
(SRB1). The UE can now read the PDCCH and PDSCH. During each DL-SCH, the UE 
checks the CRC with its C-RNTI. If the CRC is decoded successfully with its C-RNTI, 
the message is for the UE and it can find the DCI format from the payload size in that 
PDCCH.  
5. Evolved Packet System Connection Management 
There are two sets of states defined for the UE based on the information held by 
the MME as described in [10] and summarized here. The EPS mobility management 
(EMM) states of EMM-DEREGISTERED and EMM-REGISTERED are used to keep 
track of the current location of a UE. The EPS connection management (ECM) states of 
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ECM-IDLE and ECM-CONNECTED describe the signaling connectivity between the 
UE and the EPC. In general, the ECM and EMM states are independent of each other.  
The UE enters the ECM-IDLE state when its signaling connection to the MME 
has been released or broken. In the ECM-IDLE state, there is no NAS signaling 
connection between the UE and the MME, and there is no context for the UE held in the 
eNB. As a result, the UE and the network can become unsynchronized with different EPS 
bearers. The ECM-CONNECTED state occurs when a UE is in RRC_CONNECTED 
state with the eNB, has a S1 connection with the MME and the EPS bearers are 
synchronized. In the ECM-CONNECTED state, the UE location is known to the MME 
with an accuracy of a serving eNB identity. 
The UE and MME enter the EMM-REGISTERED state by a successful 
registration using the attach procedure with the eNB. After performing the detach 
procedure, the state is changed to EMM-DEREGISTERED in the UE and in the MME. In 
the EMM DEREGISTERED state, the EMM context in MME holds no valid location or 
routing information for the UE. The UE is not reachable by a MME, as the UE location is 
not known. In the EMM-DEREGISTERED state, some UE context can still be stored in 
the UE and MME to avoid running an authentication and key agreement (AKA) 
procedure during every attach procedure between the UE and MME.  
The ECM and EMM states and transitions can be seen in Figure 16. In the EMM-
REGISTERED and ECM-IDLE state, the UE performs a periodic tracking area updating 
procedure to maintain registration and enable the MME to page the UE, such as during 
the discontinuous reception (DRX) period. 
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Figure 16.  EMM and ECM state transitions (from [26]) 
D. LONG TERM EVOLUTION SECURITY 
1. Security Architecture 
A diagram of the 3GPP security architecture for LTE is shown in Figure 17. Both 
[6] and [27] present a comprehensive survey of security architecture, vulnerabilities and 
solutions in LTE and LTE-A networks. The network access security features (I) provide 
users with secure access to services, and protect against attacks on the radio access link 
[7]. The network domain security features (II), such as Internet Protocol security (IPsec), 
enable nodes to securely exchange signaling data, user data (between AN and SN, and 
within AN), and protect against attacks on the wireline network. The user domain 
security features (III) secure access to mobile stations. The application domain security 
features (IV) enable applications in the user and in the provider domain to securely 
exchange messages. The visibility and configurability of security features (V) enables the 
user to inform him whether a security feature is in operation or not and whether the use 
and provision of services should depend on the security feature. The defined security 
termination points in an EPS network are shown in Table 12. RRC integrity and 
confidentiality protection are provided by the PDCP layer between UE and eNB after the 
attach procedure and no layers below PDCP are protected [27]. Due to higher error rates 
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and longer round trip times in wireless networks, robust header compression (ROHC) is 
used to reduce the amount of header information that would travel over the air. As a 
result, security occurs below the ROHC since ROHC can only operate on unencrypted 
packets [4]. Ciphering is used for both AS and NAS signaling messages, as well as for 
AS user plane data. 
 
Figure 17.  Overview of the security architecture (from [7]) 
 
 Ciphering Integrity Protection 
NAS Signalling Required and terminated in 
MME 
Required and terminated in 
MME 
U-Plane Data Required and terminated in 
eNB  




Required and terminated in 
eNB 




Not required Not required 
NOTE 1: Integrity protection for U-Plane is not required and thus it is not 
supported between UE and Serving Gateway or for the transport of user 
plane data between eNB and Serving Gateway on S1 interface. 
 
Table 12.   Security termination points (from [19]) 
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The LTE system utilizes an authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure 
to achieve mutual authentication between the UE and the MME, as well as generate the 
ciphering key and integrity key used to derive different session keys for the encryption 
and the integrity protection [28]. Different AKA procedures are used when the UE 
accesses the EPC through distinct non-3GPP access networks. 
2. Access Stratum Security 
The lifetime of an access stratum (AS) security context is tied to the RRC 
connection because eNB keys are generated when the UE moves to connected mode and 
deleted when the UE goes to idle mode [19], [27]. Temporary identities are used to avoid 
the compromise of permanent identities between entities and reduce the time period 
during which an attacker could use them. AS security involves integrity protection and 
ciphering of RRC signaling carried by SRBs, and ciphering of user data carried by DRBs 
[21]. The RACH procedure results in a RRC_CONNECTED state and establishment of 
the dedicated SRB1. SRB1 is then used to transfer the initial NAS message from the UE 
to the MME, which results in the eNB receiving the UE context information from the 
EPC and establishing the S1 connection.  
Upon receiving the UE context from the EPC, the eNB activates security using 
the AS security mode command procedure. The RRC command and successful response 
messages to activate security are integrity protected, while ciphering starts only after 
completion of the security mode command procedure. The use of cryptographic 
protection on S1-MME and X2-C is an operator’s decision [7]. Once security is activated, 
all RRC messages receive integrity protection and ciphering by the PDCP layer. The eNB 
does not establish SRB2 and user DRBs prior to activating security and the UE only 
accepts a handover message when security has been activated. The integrity protection 
algorithm is common for SRB1 and SRB2. The ciphering algorithm is common for all 
radio bearers (i.e., SRB1, SRB2 and DRBs). SRB0 is not integrity protected or ciphered 
[7]. S1 interface signaling protection is optional [27]. The three defined SRBs (SRB0, 
SRB1 and SRB2) are used only for the transmission of RRC and NAS messages. 
 34 
AS level security mode command procedure configures AS security (RRC and 
user plane) and NAS level security mode command procedure configures NAS security. 
The eNB keys are cryptographically separated from the EPC keys used for NAS 
protection to make it impossible to use the eNB key to figure out an EPC key [19]. Once 
NAS integrity has been activated, NAS messages without integrity protection are not 
accepted by the UE or MME [7]. The NAS service request is always integrity protected 
and the NAS attach request message is integrity protected if the EPS security context is 
not deleted while the UE is in EMM-DEREGISTERED state. The NAS security context 
has a longer lifetime than the AS security context and can also stay alive when the UE 
goes to idle until the EPS security context is deleted in either the UE or MME [27].  
The AS and NAS security contexts are established during initial attach as shown 
in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18.  Establishment of NAS and AS security contexts during initial attach (from 
[27]) 
 35 
E. LONG TERM EVOLUTION DISCONTINUOUS RECEPTION 
PROTOCOL 
The LTE power saving protocols, discontinuous reception (DRX) and 
discontinuous transmission (DTX), are both configured by the radio resource control 
(RRC) protocol. DRX mode can be enabled in either the RRC_IDLE or the 
RRC_CONNECTED states in 4G LTE as shown in Figure 19. 2G and 3G networks use 
DRX in idle mode only. In Figure 19, LTE-U_u is the new DRX air link interface 
between the eNB and the UE; S1_c is the DRX control plane reference point between the 
MME and the eNB; and S1_u is the DRX user plane reference point between the eNB 
and SGW. 
 
Figure 19.  EPS DRX connection modes and states (from [29]) 
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The eNB advertises the default DRX paging cycle in 
SystemInformationBlockType2 (SIB2) during the network attach procedure. The UE can 
use the DRX page cycle broadcast in SIB2 or propose a DRX cycle length using the 
InDeviceCoexIndication message [21]. In DRX mode, the UE powers down most of its 
circuitry when there are no packets to be transmitted or received [29]. The UE’s 
transceiver is turned on periodically to transmit or receive packets. During DRX, the UE 
can still make periodic neighboring cell signal quality measurements and tracking area 
updates that it sends in periodic uplink packets to the eNB. Whether the UE keeps in sync 
with uplink transmission or not depends on whether the UE is registered with an eNB 
(RRC_CONNECTED state) or not (RRC_IDLE state). The transition between the short 
DRX cycle, the long DRX cycle and continuous reception is controlled either by a timer 
or by explicit commands from the eNB [30]. 
1. Short and Long Discontinuous Reception Cycles 
The DRX cycle generally consists of a periodic repetition of an active time or “on 
duration” when the UE monitors the PDCCH, and an inactive time or “sleep mode” when 
it does not monitor downlink channels, as shown in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20.  DRX cycles and timing (from [22]) 
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A short DRX cycle has a shorter inactive time and is generally used for bursts of 
traffic where packets arrive more often with inactivity in between, such as in web 
browsing. The UE monitors the physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) more 
frequently during the short DRX cycle. The long DRX cycle has a longer inactive time 
and is most often used when packets arrive at a lower rate or during periods of low 
activity, such as during the RRC_IDLE state. The UE is usually configured to use a short 
DRX cycle for a predefined time before enabling a constant long DRX cycle to reduce 
the UE wake up time in case unexpected data arrives immediately after the DRX cycle is 
enabled [29]. Durations for long and short DRX are configured by the RRC and the 
transition is determined by eNB MAC control commands or by the UE based on an 
activity timer [4]. 
2. Connected State 
The DRX mode can be enabled in RRC_CONNECTED state by either the eNB or 
UE when there are no outstanding or new packets to be transmitted or received [29]. In 
this state, the S1, NAS, and RRC connections are active and the rest of the network is 
unaware of the DRX data exchange on the air interface.  
When the UE periodically wakes up, it checks to determine if pages have been 
transmitted by the eNB on the PDCCH with a radio network temporary identifier (C-
RNTI or TPC-PUCCH-RNTI or TPC-PUSCH-RNTI or semi-persistent scheduling C-
RNTI) assigned by the network during the attach procedure. The UE will return to active 
mode whenever a packet arrives from the eNB for it or whenever the UE needs to 
transmit packets to the eNB. 
3. Idle State 
When the UE does not have packets to be received and/or transmitted for an 
extended period of time, the UE will transition from the short to the long DRX period. 
The eNB will initiate the release of UE’s RRC connection and request the MME to 
release the UE’s S1 connection [29]. Subsequently, the eNB will remove the UE’s 
context from the database, but the MME and SGW will only remove the eNB specific 
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part of the UE context. In this RRC_IDLE state, the UE is registered with EPS mobility 
management (EMM) but does not have an active session, meaning the S1, NAS, and 
RRC connections are non-existent [29]. The UE controls mobility by using signal quality 
measurements and tracking area updates of neighboring cells.  
During this long DRX period, the UE wakes up periodically to listen to downlink 
transmissions and can initiate uplink traffic by requesting a RRC connection with the 
serving eNB. If the S-GW detects data addressed to the UE, the MME will ask all eNBs 
in the tracking area where the UE was last seen to transmit a page to the UE. If a UE 
finds its temporary mobile subscriber identity (STMSI) in the page message, it will 
initiate the random access procedure by sending the random access channel (RACH) 
preamble to the eNB. In RRC_CONNECTED state, the UE will send a transparent 
payload containing the NAS service request to the eNB, which will be forwarded to the 
MME, and the UE will return to EMM_ACTIVE mode. The eNB will then enable over-
the-air encryption by sending the security mode command to the MME and establish the 
default data bearer. 
4. User Equipment Feature Group Indicators 
During the attach procedure, the UE signals its support for DRX which is 
forwarded to the MME [10]. Each bit of the feature group indicators (FGI) indicates the 
UE’s support of a specific feature and is submitted to the network during the initial 
registration and attach procedure as part of the UE capability transfer [22]. Bits 4 and 5 
define the support of the DRX cycle as shown in Figure 21.  
 
Figure 21.  Bits 4 and 5 of UE feature group indicators (from [31]) 
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5. Medium Access Control Protocol Layer  
The transition between the long and short DRX cycles is determined by the 
medium access control (MAC) layer control commands in the eNB or by the UE based 
on information exchanged during the attach procedure. The MAC handles the broadcast 
channel (BCH), downlink shared channel (DL-SCH), paging channel (PCH), uplink 
shared channel (UL-SCH) and the random access channel (RACH) [16].  
A MAC protocol data unit (PDU) consists of a variable size MAC header, zero or 
more MAC random access responses (RAR) or payloads and optional padding as shown 
in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22.  MAC protocol data unit (from [16]) 
The MAC RAR contains the 16-bit temporary C-RNTI used by the UE during 
RACH procedure as shown in Figure 23.  
 
Figure 23.  MAC Random access response (from [16]) 
The RRC MAC-MainConfig message, which is used to specify the MAC main 
configuration for signaling and data radio bearers, contains a DRX-Config section [27]. 
Table 13 describes some of the parameters and timers specified in DRX-Config. 
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DRX PARAMETER DESCRIPTION 
Active time Time during which the UE is awake and monitors the 
PDCCH in PDCCH sub-frames 
drx-InactivityTimer The number of consecutive PDCCH sub-frame(s) to wait 
before enabling DRX after the sub-frame in which a 
PDCCH indicates an initial uplink or downlink user data 
transmission for this UE. Keeps UE awake for a certain 
period during data transfer even if the on-duration is 
expired 
drx-RetransmissionTimer The maximum number of consecutive PDCCH sub-
frame(s) until a downlink retransmission is received 
drxShortCycleTimer The number of consecutive sub-frame(s) the UE shall 
follow the short DRX cycle 
drxStartOffset The sub-frame where the DRX cycle starts 
onDurationTimer The number of consecutive PDCCH sub-frame(s) the 
UE reads at the beginning of a DRX cycle. Defines the 
minimum average awake time of a UE. 
longDRX-CycleStartOffset If the short DRX cycle is configured, the value of the 
long DRX cycle is a multiple of the short DRX cycle in 
number of sub-frames. 
Table 13.   DRX parameters (after [16]) 
The MAC layer multiplexes data units from logical channels to transport 
channels. Logical channels are differentiated by a five bit logical channel identity (LCID) 
included in the MAC PDU header. The MAC PDU header consists of one or more MAC 
PDU sub-headers, and each sub-header corresponds to either a MAC SDU or a MAC 
control element or padding. A MAC PDU sub-header consists of the six header fields 
R/R/E/LCID/F/L, except for the last sub-header, which consists solely of the four header 
fields R/R/E/LCID as shown in Figure 24. A maximum of one MAC PDU can be 
transmitted per transport block per UE. Therefore, the UE has one MAC PDU in the 
uplink and the eNB will have multiple parallel MAC PDUs in the downlink direction 
since it handles multiple UEs.  
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Figure 24.  Example of MAC PDU (from [16]) 
There is one LCID field for each MAC SDU, MAC control element or padding 
included in the MAC PDU. The defined LCIDs are shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26.  
 
Figure 25.  Values of LCID for DL-SCH (from [16]) 
 
Figure 26.  Values of LCID for UL-SCH (from [16]) 
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F. RELATED WORK IN LONG TERM EVOLUTION SECURITY 
VULNERABILITIES DURING DISCONTINUOUS RECEPTION PERIOD 
It has been suggested in a few LTE security research papers that the long 
discontinuous reception (DRX) period is one of several potential security vulnerabilities 
in LTE [5], [6]. However, no research has been conducted to show how such an exploit 
could actually be conducted during the long DRX period, nor why the LTE DRX 
protocol is vulnerable to cyber attacks given its robust security architecture. Part of the 
reason may be that the impact of these security vulnerabilities is dependent on the vendor 
implementation of DRX algorithms. Currently, most of the Qualcomm based LTE 
handsets do not fully implement the connected mode DRX feature [20]. 
In [5], Fosberg et al. state that the PHY data frame (transport block) is not 
encrypted in both the downlink and uplink directions, making it possible for any attacker 
with a receiver to detect and read the control (C-PDU) and data (D-PDU) protocol data 
units of the RLC/MAC/PDCP sub-layers inside them. They assume that a passive 
attacker can understand the PDUs and associate them with the C-RNTIs. Their 
assumption that there is no confidentiality or integrity protection at MAC layer but there 
is integrity protection on the RRC layer is correct given the information in Table 12.  The 
C-RNTI and related resource allocation and other PHY control information is transmitted 
in the downlink without security during the RACH procedure as explained in Section 
II.D.2. Since the same C-RNTI is used by the UE within a tracking area, it would provide 
UE presence information for an attacker and a possible way to correlate the C-RNTI with 
the user’s service level identity. Fosberg et al. claim that a potential security hole exists 
during the DRX period in active mode when the UE keeps its context (e.g., C-RNTI) in 
the eNB and is still allowed to transmit packets [5]. They conclude that “an adversary can 
inject a C-PDU to the system by using the C-RNTI of a UE in long DRX period,” but not 
a D-PDU which is protected by upper layer security mechanisms, “and the cost to launch 
this attack is lower than radio jamming attack.” The possible denial of service (DoS) 
attack described is shown in Figure 27.  
 43 
 
Figure 27.  Denial of service attack using C-RNTI (from [5]) 
An attacker can also passively track a UE based on the packet sequence numbers. 
As Forsberg et al. state [5],  
If the user plane (RLC, PDCP) or control plane (RRC, NAS) packet 
sequence numbers are continuous before and after a handover, a passive 
attacker can guess the mapping between the old and new C-RNTIs with a 
high probability based on the continuity of the packet sequence numbers.  
An eNB uses buffer status reports sent by a UE in a C-PDU for packet scheduling, 
load balancing, and admission control. Foster et al. claim that during the long DRX 
period, an attacker could actively impersonate the UE by sending fake buffer status 
reports that report more data to send than are actually buffered. Since the UE does not 
send these reports during the long DRX period, the fake buffer status report will not 
conflict with real reports from an active UE as shown in Figure 28. As a result, if the eNB 
thinks there is congestion in the cell, it may not accept newly arriving UEs. Their 
proposed solution to these attacks is a periodic re-allocation of the C-RNTI to make it 
more difficult for an attacker to detect if new UEs are arriving or if existing ones are 
getting refreshed C-RNTIs. Another proposed solution is ciphering of RRC messages. 
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Figure 28.  Successful packet injection attack (from [5]) 
Seddigh et al. [6] provide a good description of security in LTE and WiMax. 
Expanding upon the information in [5], Seddigh et al. suggest two other ways a DoS 
attack could be launched using the C-RNTI. The first way against a particular UE could 
be accomplished by an attacker intercepting the resource scheduling information and the 
C-RNTI to send an uplink control signal at the scheduled time creating a conflict at the 
eNB and service problems for the real UE. The second way is by injecting C-PDU 
packets during the DRX period to cause DoS attacks against newly arriving users. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A review of the current Long Term Evolution (LTE) standards at the 3GPP 
website and current work in security vulnerabilities was conducted and is summarized in 
Section II. Detailed information on the radio resource control (RRC) and discontinuous 
reception (DRX) protocols was gathered and analyzed. In this section, a review of the 
open source ns-3 network LTE simulator is conducted to ascertain if it can be used to 
demonstrate security vulnerabilities in LTE. To verify the results of the simulator, it is 
also necessary to analyze captured LTE packet traces and use them as input to the 
simulator. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF NS-3 OPEN SOURCE NETWORK SIMULATOR  
ns-3 is a free discrete-event network simulator, licensed under the GNU GPLv2 
license1 and is publicly available for research, development, and educational use [32]. It 
is built as a system of open source software libraries primarily developed on GNU/Linux 
platforms that work together. ns-3 is distributed as source code, so the target system 
needs to have a software development environment to build the libraries first before 
building the user programs.  
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE LENA MODULE IN NS-3  
LENA is a free open source product-oriented LTE/EPC network simulator based 
on the ns-3 network simulator.2 The most recent stable version of the LENA code 
(version 8) gets periodically merged with the most recent official stable version of ns-3 
(ns-3.19) and is available from the ns-3 website. It is actively being used for research 
[33]. 
The following information was found in the manual for LENA [34]. The manual 
includes examples of writing simulation programs using ns-3, including configuration of 
various LTE and EPC model parameters. LENA supports the femto application platform 
                                                 
1 More information can be found at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html  
2 More information can be found at http://networks.cttc.es/mobile-networks/software-tools/lena/  
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interface (FAPI) published by the FemtoForum3 for LTE femtocells. FAPI is a logical 
specification only, and its implementation is left to the vendors. The LENA simulator is 
designed to be independent from vendor-specific implementations of FAPI. 
The LTE-EPC simulation model is shown in Figure 29. The LTE model includes 
the radio protocol stack (RRC, PDCP, RLC, MAC, PHY) within the UE and the eNB 
nodes. The EPC model includes the core network interfaces, protocols and entities within 
the SGW, PGW and MME nodes, and partially within the eNB nodes. 
Figure 29.  Overview of the LTE-EPC simulation model (from [34]) 
The LTE model supports evaluation of radio resource management, QoS-aware 
packet scheduling, inter-cell interference coordination and dynamic spectrum access. The 
architecture of the LTE radio protocol stack model of the UE in the data plane is shown 
in Figure 30 and for the control plane in Figure 31. The architecture of the PHY and 
channel model of the UE is shown in Figure 32.  
The channel model uses the SpectrumChannel interface in the ns-3 spectrum 
module. The ns-3 Buildings module is used as a propagation model by indicating the 
position of the node (i.e., whether it is indoor or outdoor, and what is its z-axis with 
respect to the rooftop level). LENA considers frequency division duplexing (FDD) only 
                                                 
3More information can be found at http://www.smallcellforum.org/resources-technical-papers  
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and implements downlink and uplink propagation separately. A trace-based fading model 
is available, but it needs a lot of memory for storing the traces. The LTE PHY model 
supports antenna modeling using the ns-3 AntennaModel class with the 
IsotropicAntennaModel as the default. 
The LTE model includes a random access procedure, as well as the PHY, MAC, 
RLC and PDCP protocol layers. It currently supports the output to file of PHY, MAC, 
RLC and PDCP level key performance indicators (KPIs). 
 
Figure 30.  LTE radio protocol stack model for UE on the data plane (from [34]) 
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Figure 31.  LTE radio protocol stack model for UE on the control plane (from [34]) 
 
 
Figure 32.  LTE PHY and channel model architecture for UE (from [34]) 
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The architecture of the LTE radio protocol stack model of the eNB is shown in 
Figure 33 and for the control plane in Figure 34. The architecture of the PHY and channel 
model of the eNB is shown in Figure 35. The physical layer model includes the inter cell 
interference calculation and the simulation of uplink traffic, including both packet 
transmission and CQI generation. 
Figure 33.  LTE radio protocol stack architecture for eNB on the data plane (from [34]) 
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Figure 34.  LTE radio protocol stack architecture for eNB on the control plane (from 
[34]) 
 
Figure 35.  LTE PHY and channel model architecture for eNB (from [34]) 
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In the EPC model, the SGW and PGW functional entities are implemented within 
a single node referred to as the SGW/PGW node. Simulation of end-to-end IP 
connectivity over the LTE model supporting interconnection of multiple UEs to the 
Internet, via a radio access network of multiple eNBs connected to the SGW/PGW node, 
is supported. Only IPv4 is supported. X2-based handover between two eNBs and multiple 
EPS bearers for each UE can be simulated. The end-to-end LTE-EPC data plane protocol 
stack, including the 3GPP S1-U protocol and the LTE radio protocol stack layers, in the 
simulator can be seen in Figure 36. The S5 or S8 interfaces are not modeled at all since a 
combined SGW and PGW node is used. 
Figure 36.  LTE-EPC data plane protocol stack in LENA model (from [34]) 
The architecture of the EPC control plane model is shown in Figure 37. The S1-
AP and the S11 control interfaces are modeled simply as a direct function call between 
the two objects. The X2-AP control interface is modeled more accurately using protocol 




Figure 37.  EPC control plane model (from [34]) 
The sub-frame structure in LENA is divided into a control and a data part as 
shown in Figure 38. The model assumes that the downlink control frame starts at the 
beginning of each sub-frame and lasts up to three symbols across the whole system 
bandwidth, where the actual duration is provided by the PCFICH. A PDCCH transports a 
single message DCI coming from the MAC layer, where the scheduler indicates the 
resource allocation for a specific user. The sounding reference signal (SRS) is 
periodically placed in the last symbol of the sub-frame in the whole system bandwidth. 
The RRC module includes an algorithm for dynamically assigning the SRS periodicity as 
function of the actual number of UEs attached to an eNB according to the UE-specific 
procedure specified in [17].  
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Figure 38.  LTE sub-frame in LENA (from [34]) 
The RRC model implemented in the simulator provides the following 
functionality: 
 generation at the eNB and interpretation at the UE of the MIB, SIB1 and 
SIB2 
 initial cell selection 
 RRC connection establishment procedure 
 RRC reconfiguration procedure 




C. USER EQUIPMENT DISCONTINUOUS RECEPTION PERIOD 
ALGORITHM 
There is no standardized DRX algorithm. Table 14 shows a pseudo-code 





















Table 14.   User equipment DRX pseudo-code (from [35]) 
if (drx-Config == setup)  { 
 
  if ((Short DRX Cycle is configured/activated) &&  
 ([(SFN * 10) + subframe number] mod (shortDRX_Cycle) ==  
  (drxStartOffset) mod (shortDRX_Cycle))  { 
     start onDurationTimer;     } 
 
  if ((Long DRX Cycle is configured/activated)  
   && ( [(SFN * 10) + subframe number] mod (longDRX_Cycle) == (drxStartOffset) ) { 
     start onDurationTimer;     } 
 
  if ( (a HARQ RTT Timer expires in this subframe) &&  
 (data in the soft buffer of the corresponding HARQ process was not successfully decoded) 
{ 
     start the drx-RetransmissionTimer for the corresponding HARQ process;  } 
 
  if ( DRX Command MAC control element is received ) { 
     stop onDurationTimer; 
     stop drx-InactivityTimer;   } 
 
  if ( (drx-InactivityTimer expires) ||  
  (DRX Command MAC control element is received in this subframe) { 
     if (the Short DRX cycle is configured ) {  
       start or restart drxShortCycleTimer; 
       use the Short DRX Cycle;   } 
  else { 
       use the Long DRX cycle;   } 
  } 
 
  if ( drxShortCycleTimer expires in this subframe ) { 
     use the Long DRX cycle;   } 
 
  if ( during the Active Time, for a PDCCH-subframe,  
   if the subframe is not required for uplink transmission for halfduplex FDD UE operation and  
   if the subframe is not part of a configured measurement gap)  { 
     monitor the PDCCH; 
     if (PDCCH indicates a DL transmission ||  
  DL assignment has been configured for this subframe )  {  
       start the HARQ RTT Timer for the corresponding HARQ process; 
       stop the drx-RetransmissionTimer for the corresponding HARQ process;   } 
 
     if (the PDCCH indicates a new transmission (DL or UL) ) {  
       start or restart drx-InactivityTimer;   } 
   } 
 
  if ( not in the Active Time)  { 




Using an Ubuntu 12.0 Linux desktop virtual machine (VM) within Oracle’s VM 
VirtualBox, the tools and current official stable release of the ns-3 network simulator was 
downloaded and built successfully using the instructions on the website.4 The tools are 
slightly different for download and build of an official release from those to get and build 
development copies of ns-3. User programs are written in either the C++ or Python 
programming languages and link with ns-3 libraries. The minimal software requirements 
to run basic simulations are a gcc/g++ installation of 3.4 or gcc-4.2 or greater, and Python 
2.4 or greater. There are functions to visualize the simulations, as well as provide libpcap 
traces. 
A suite of test programs can be run using a Python script after installation to 
ensure it was built correctly. The ns-3 documentation contains a basic tutorial to learn 
how to start using it and information on using the LTE module. Example programs can be 
used as a starting point for creating one’s own program in a scratch directory or a series 
of related programs in a module. There is a very comprehensive tracing mechanism for 
debugging and producing output of various parameters from the simulations. In 
VirtualBox, a shared folder between the host computer and the ns-3 VM was created to 
view and graph simulation output data on the host computer. 
A. NS-3 LENA MODEL SIMULATOR LIMITATIONS 
The open source ns-3 network simulator was investigated as a tool but it was 
found that the LTE model was incomplete and did not include a complete medium access 
control protocol or the DRX power saving algorithm in it. 
A simplified random access procedure is used in the model, meaning the control 
messages do not consume any actual radio resources. A protocol interference model is 
used so that whenever two or more identical preambles are transmitted in the same cell 
by multiple UEs during the same transmission time interval, neither of these identical 
                                                 
4 Installation instructions and releases of ns-3 can be found at http://www.nsnam.org/ 
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preambles will be received by the eNB. This means that the contention resolution part of 
the random access procedure is not modeled and the UE assumes random access was 
successful once the UE’s MAC receives the random access response from the eNB and 
sends the message NotifyRandomAccessSuccessful to the UE’s RRC. Automatic initial 
cell selection is only available for EPC-enabled simulations, so LTE-only simulations 
must use the manual attachment method with the assumption that the information 
contained in the master information block is already known.  
The MAC control elements, both header and PDU, are not accurately modeled in 
the simulator, only RLC and PDCP PDUs are. As a result, it is not possible to get the 
temporary C-RNTI from the MAC PDU. The example simulation program did print out 
the C-RNTI in their log file, but it was not obtained from the MAC layer PDU.  
The focus of the EPC model is mainly on the data plane and on simulations of 
active users in ECM connected mode. Therefore, the EPC control plane is not accurately 
modeled as specified by 3GPP. Both radio link failure and the transition to RRC idle 
mode from the connected mode are missing in the simulator. Additionally, the RRC 
connection release in the simulator is currently never triggered by the EPC or by the 
NAS. This is unfortunate since RRC connection release is required by the DRX protocol 
in the RRC_IDLE State. The long DRX procedure also gets triggered when the UE 
switches from RRC connected to RRC idle modes, which is not implemented. 
Security related aspects are not modeled, therefore SRB1 is always used and 
SRB2 is never activated since SRB2 is always configured by the E-UTRAN after security 
activation. The NAS model does not support any location update/paging procedure in idle 
mode, something also needed for the DRX mode. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF LONG TERM EVOLUTION TRACES 
The NPS Electrical Engineering department has packet traces from LTE captured 
using the commercially available Sanjole Wavejudge software. The free Wireshark 
network protocol analyzer tool indicates a capability to decode the LTE medium access 
control, radio link control and packet data convergence protocol headers if LTE packet 
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traces are captured using the dissectors for those headers. However, very little evidence 
was available of anyone having used it successfully.  
The NPS traces were not in the libpcap file format required by Wireshark and 
neither was the power saving algorithm used when the traces were recorded. As a result, 
it was not possible to decode the traces and demonstrate that the security protocols were 
weak during the attach procedure or during the power saving mode. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Most researchers have focused on improving LTE’s performance and efficiency 
for the past ten years and have only recently started investigating the security 
vulnerabilities of LTE [5], [6], [27], [28], [36], [37]. The development of the LTE 
standards have taken into account the security deficiencies of prior generations of 
wireless communications technologies, but some researchers have theorized cyber attacks 
could still occur in LTE during times when those security protocols are either inactive or 
weak. Both [27] and [6] present a comprehensive survey of security architecture, 
vulnerabilities and solutions in LTE and LTE-A networks. The specific vulnerabilities in 
LTE often mentioned include illegal use of user and mobile equipment, location tracking, 
denial of service attacks and data integrity attacks. However, none of the researchers have 
provided any experimental data to support the claims of such vulnerabilities.  
It has been suggested in some LTE security research papers that the long DRX 
period is one of several potential security vulnerabilities in LTE [5], [6]. Analysis of LTE 
standards in Section II revealed that the user’s equipment can be vulnerable to a cyber 
attack during the network attach mode, or during the long-term power saving mode, 
because security protocols are either inactive or weak. It is hypothesized that if one 
obtains the user identity information sent in the clear during network attach, it could then 
be used to conduct a denial of service or data integrity attack during the long-term power 
saving mode. 
As discussed in Section IV, the open source ns-3 network simulator was 
investigated as a tool to demonstrate the exploit, but it was found that the LTE model was 
incomplete and did not include the complete MAC protocol or the DRX power saving 
algorithm. Next, analysis of captured LTE packet traces available at NPS was considered. 
The Wireshark network protocol analyzer tool indicates a capability to decode the LTE 
medium access control, radio link control and packet data convergence protocol headers 
if LTE packet traces are captured using the dissectors for those headers. However, the 
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NPS LTE packet traces available were not in the libpcap file format required by 
Wireshark and neither was the power saving algorithm in effect when the traces were 
recorded by the commercially available Sanjole Wavejudge software. As a result, it was 
not possible to analyze if the security protocols were weak during the attach procedure or 
during the power saving mode. 
Several limitations of the currently available tools have made it difficult to test the 
hypothesis at this time. Empirical data from actual measurements of LTE network traffic 
with the DRX algorithm is needed to analyze and design an efficient mechanism for 
using a UE’s C-RNTI during the long DRX period in a cyber attack. The LTE standards 
have parameters defined for DRX but do not specify how to implement the algorithm. In 
fact, very few device vendors have implemented DRX, though many currently have plans 
to do so in the future. Appropriate laboratory testing equipment and software for 
analyzing LTE signals are required to demonstrate a cyber attack in LTE, both of which 
were not available at the time of this thesis. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
In order to successfully demonstrate the vulnerability of LTE to cyber attacks 
during the long DRX period in the future, several issues need to be resolved.  
First of all, algorithms for DRX at the UE, eNB and MME need to be developed 
and standardized. Currently, most of the Qualcomm based LTE handsets do not fully 
implement the connected mode DRX feature [20], but it is not known if they implement 
the idle mode DRX feature. The LTE standards have provided for the DRX parameters to 
be exchanged between the UE, eNB and MME, but have left it up to the device vendors 
to implement the algorithm themselves. No open source implementations of DRX 
algorithms were found, indicating that they will be proprietary algorithms developed by 
the vendors. Without standardization of the algorithms, one would have to take into 
account which vendor’s equipment is being used, complicating the simulations. There are 
currently a lot of researchers investigating efficient DRX algorithms [38]. 
Second, in order to use the open source ns-3 network simulator, programs for the 
transition from RRC connected to idle modes, the DRX algorithms and the AS security 
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mode command procedure would all need to be added. From discussions with the 
maintainers of ns-3, the conclusion was that it would take someone working full-time a 
couple of years to add all that code to the ns-3 simulator.  
Finally, it would be worthwhile to investigate capturing actual traces of LTE 
packets for analysis using Wireshark’s dissectors for LTE medium access control, radio 
link control and packet data convergence protocol headers. Without those dissectors, 
trying to decode the packets is extremely difficult, if not impossible. The captured LTE 
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